Abstract:

My dissertation explores the relationship between the Extended Mind hypothesis and its metaphysical considerations for personal identity. Specifically, I defend the proposition that certain kinds of extended cognition entail an extended self. To accomplish this task, I begin by explicating the Extended Mind hypothesis. Then, I develop the Extended Self thesis by elucidating its central tenets and explaining how it fits within the scope of personal identity. In so doing, I explore different possibilities for an extended self and address various ways in which the theory of the extended self can handle common thought experiments such as fission, fusion, and bionic brain part replacement. I also confront a major problem for the Extended Self thesis which is the apparent inability to individuate between coinciding selves. I move on to argue for the ‘Subject thesis,’ which is the view that a subject must extend as far as its thinking does. That sets up the conditions according to which relevant entailment holds between certain kinds of extended cognitive processes and the Extended Self thesis. Finally, I defend the Extended Self thesis against objections made by proponents of two prominent views; namely, ‘the constitution view’ and ‘the human animal view.’ In both cases, I argue that errors are made in assessing the Extended Self thesis. The conclusion is that the Extended Mind hypothesis implies the Extended Self thesis.