Abstract:
My dissertation explores the
relationship between the Extended Mind hypothesis and its metaphysical
considerations for personal identity. Specifically, I defend the proposition
that certain kinds of extended cognition entail an extended self. To
accomplish this task, I begin by explicating the Extended Mind hypothesis.
Then, I develop the Extended Self thesis by elucidating its central tenets and
explaining how it fits within the scope of personal identity. In so doing, I
explore different possibilities for an extended self and address various ways in
which the theory of the extended self can handle common thought experiments
such as fission, fusion, and bionic brain part replacement. I also confront a major
problem for the Extended Self thesis which is the apparent inability to
individuate between coinciding selves. I move on to argue for the ‘Subject
thesis,’ which is the view that a subject must extend as far as its thinking
does. That sets up the conditions according to which relevant entailment holds between
certain kinds of extended cognitive processes and the Extended Self thesis. Finally,
I defend the Extended Self thesis against objections made by proponents of two
prominent views; namely, ‘the constitution view’ and ‘the human animal view.’
In both cases, I argue that errors are made in assessing the Extended Self
thesis. The conclusion is that the Extended Mind hypothesis implies the
Extended Self thesis.
