Tool use in time

Tool use and mind: The extended self as implied by the extended mind

Without a clear thesis, you have no dissertation topic. The thesis should be expressed in one to three sentences (three seems the absolute maximum). Also, you should have a technical way of explaining your thesis to experts in your field, but you should also have a non-technical way of explaining your thesis to non-experts.

Technical thesis: Defend the claim that the relevant material implication holds between the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Extended Self thesis. Letting ‘M’ be The Extended Mind is ‘true’', and letting ‘S’ be 'the Extended Self thesis is ‘true’', I defend:

(*) Mà S

Non-technical thesis: I am working on how the way we think informs us about who we are. My research seeks to construct a theory of mind that places some parts of thinking outside of the biological brain. I then explore what that might mean for the way we define human persons.

Abstract:

My dissertation explores the relationship between the Extended Mind hypothesis and its metaphysical considerations for personal identity. Specifically, I defend the proposition that certain kinds of extended cognition entail an extended self. To accomplish this task, I begin by explicating the Extended Mind hypothesis. Then, I develop the Extended Self thesis by elucidating its central tenets and explaining how it fits within the scope of personal identity. In so doing, I explore different possibilities for an extended self and address various ways in which the theory of the extended self can handle common thought experiments such as fission, fusion, and bionic brain part replacement. I also confront a major problem for the Extended Self thesis which is the apparent inability to individuate between coinciding selves. I move on to argue for the ‘Subject thesis,’ which is the view that a subject must extend as far as its thinking does. That sets up the conditions according to which relevant entailment holds between certain kinds of extended cognitive processes and the Extended Self thesis. Finally, I defend the Extended Self thesis against objections made by proponents of two prominent views; namely, ‘the constitution view’ and ‘the human animal view.’ In both cases, I argue that errors are made in assessing the Extended Self thesis. The conclusion is that the Extended Mind hypothesis implies the Extended Self thesis.

My blog posts over the next month will be for the purpose of prepping the topical defense of my dissertation. There are two parts for the dissertation process. The first is to propose a plan for the dissertation by providing about a 20 page high level summary of what you intend to do, and the research you plan to use to accomplish that task. This is called 'the topical defense'. I will defend that soon.
Less soon, I will defend the actual dissertation. And, what I will do is post parts of my chapters as I am working through them. As a result, any feedback on grammar, structure, or otherwise is most welcome.

What is the Extended Mind Thesis?

(Source: FreeDigitalPhotos.net, 2012)

The main argument for the Extended Mind (Going forward simply, 'the EM') is presented in Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) article, “The Extended Mind.” There, Clark and Chalmers propose an account of human cognition, for which the boundaries of the human person’s cognitive abilities are able to extend beyond the boundaries of the brain, or brain and body, alone. Clark and Chalmers introduce a defense of the EM by using a thought experiment involving two people, Inga and Otto (p. 12-14). Both Inga and Otto wish to go and see a particular exhibit in an art museum. Inga simply recalls the location of the art museum in a manner understood to be, “a normal case of belief embedded memory” (p. 12). That is to say, Inga retrieves the location through the cognitive process of memory, comes to believe that the art museum is at that particular location, and proceeds to it. Otto, on the other hand, is an Alzheimer’s patient who can only “remember” the location of the art museum by relying on a notebook. To get to the museum, Otto retrieves the location by first referring to the notebook. He then comes to believe that the art museum is at that particular location, and proceeds to it.

Clark and Chalmers state that the only significant difference between these two cases is the instrument (or vehicle) through which Inga and Otto retrieve the information about the location of the art museum. Noting that Otto uses a notebook to form his belief, Clark and Chalmers assert that, “beliefs can be constituted partly by features of the environment, when those features play the right sort of role in driving cognitive processes” (p. 12). Here, under the general taxonomy of memory, the cognitive process that Clark and Chalmers are interested in is the retrieval of explicit (or declarative) semantic memory that satisfies the condition of “knowing that” (Surprenant and Neath, 2009, p. 11). But, the broader implication for episodic memory remains equally applicable as well. Given that Clark and Chalmers hold that the only significant difference between Inga’s and Otto’s belief is Otto’s incorporation of an object external to the human body, e.g. the notebook, they suggest that there are cases in which an external feature (or object) plays a vital and necessary role in not only cueing but also tracing the retrieval of information.

The ‘Inga and Otto’ thought experiment is intended to tug on the strings of the reader’s intuitions in order to highlight two key notions that underpin the EM; namely, ‘the parity principle’ and ‘the coupling relation’.  The parity principle asserts external features should be included as a proper part of the cognitive process. As Clark and Chalmers summarize:

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head! (p. 8).

The parity principle has implications for where to draw the boundary around what constitutes a cognitive process.  Specifically, it is contrasted with the view that cognitive processes of a human person operate solely within the confines of the enduring entity that is the human organism, as defined by the physical boundaries of that body or some component contained therein.[1] Such a perspective demarcates the human body, or as Clark (2003) refers to it, “the biological skin-bag” (p. 5), as the boundary of the cognitive system and rejects the idea that any features external to the body can actually constitute part of the process of cognition (as opposed to merely prompting or supporting such processes). This, Clark suggests, is a “bioprejudice,” which is to say that it is, “the prejudice that whatever matters about my mind must depend solely on what goes on…inside the ancient fortress of skin and skull” (2003, p. 5).

In addition to the parity principle, the second notion underpinning the EM is the coupling relation (I will call this ‘relation C’). ‘Relation C’ is a binary relation in which the parity principle holds between the human organism and an external feature and operates as a necessary vehicle in the construction of a cognitive process. Therefore, relation C makes it so the external object plays a causally active role (or a proper part) in constituting an overarching cognitive process. In this way, the external object moves from being merely an influential role, to playing a vehicular role because it play a proper part as the instrument through which a particular cognitive process is obtained. Specifically, the external vehicle should meet the following criteria which Clark (2010) notes should work, “in much the same way as is typically achieved by biological encoding” (p. 84). (1) the external vehicle should be easy to access; (2) the external vehicle should be reliable; and (3) the external vehicle should be poised, as Clark (2010) puts it, for “automatic ‘use’ (deployment would be a better word)” (p. 84).

Suffice to say, not any coupling relation will satisfy relation C, and the right kind of coupling should be in place in order for an external feature to play a proper part of a human cognitive system. While less is known about biological encoding of memory than is often presumed, relation C establishes the right kind of coupling relation by drawing a direct comparison to say, “if we would accept something intuitively as a cognitive process were it to go on ‘inside the head’ then that is the same function criteria, sans the internal component, that should allow features external to the human organism be a proper part to that process.”

References

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 57(1), 7-19. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150

Clark, A. (2003). Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, A. (2005). Intrinsic Content, Active Memory and the Extended Mind. Analysis, 65(1), 1-11. Retrieved January 11, 2012, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329327

Clark, A. (2008). Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind?*. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1), 37-59. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00114.x

Clark, A. (2010). Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended. In R. Menary (Ed.), The Extended Mind (pp. 43-66). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Surprenant, A. M., & Neath, I. (2007). Principles of memory: Models and perspectives. Hove: Psychology. 

 

---

[1] This would be inclusive of those perspectives according to which the person is the body, or those who believe that the human person is “contained” in the human body.

Introductory Post

(Unknown Master, Italian (active 1570s) - 1959)

The primary purpose of this blog is to provide a centralized source for my research on both extended cognition and extended human persons. I will adopt the terminology used by Clark and Chalmers (1998) article The Extended Mind which refers to cognition that extends beyond the brain (or brain and body) of the human organism alone as ‘the Extended Mind Thesis’ (Henceforth, ‘EM’). I will also use their term 'the Extended Self' (Or, ‘the ES’) to refer to the notion that the human person (or self) extends beyond the human organism. The blog posts will vary: sometimes I will only discuss the EM; other times I will only discuss the ES; still others, I will be interested in the relationship between the two.  Aside from random musings such as reflections on what I am currently reading, the research presented here will (hopefully) play either a direct or indirect part in the grand crescendo that is my dissertation. My intent is to open up that research for discussion on a global stage in order to get constructive feedback, criticisms, etc. I’ll first break down the three parts of my research which will give you a sense of what you will find on this blog.

1. Pertaining to the EM, there will not be much, if anything, that I can add to the discussion. So, I will mainly stick to simply summarizing arguments made by others and keeping up-to-date with observable phenomena that might support the EM. Examples of questions that I will undertake researching are:
1. What, precisely, is the EM? How does it contrast with other theories of cognition? How is it better or worse than other theories?
2. What are legitimate (and illegitimate) examples of the EM at work?  
3. What are some common criticisms of the EM and what are those replies? Any novel criticisms? Any novel replies?
2. Pertaining to the relationship between the EM and the ES, the questions are as follows:
1. Does the EM imply the ES? Or, can it? Or, should it?
2. Can you have the same human organism have an extended mind without being an extended self? What would be the necessary and sufficient conditions?
3. Can you have the same human organism be an extended self without having an extended mind? What would be the necessary and sufficient conditions?
3. Pertaining to the ES, there is much opportunity for development and progression in thought. Too few scientists, if any, have actually engaged the metaphysical implications of the EM and too few metaphysicians have afforded the space for developing a robust notion of the ES. This likely has to do with the fact that one may or may not have to do with the other. Both the scientists and metaphysicians seem content with the fact that the EM can be compartmentalized within the realm of empirical science with no metaphysical implications for the person. But what can/should be made of the ES?
1. What is an ES?
2. Does positing the ES provide one with a viable metaphysical framework?
3. What of persistence, self-interest, and other issues in personal identity?